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ABSTRACT
The secure “pairing” of wireless devices based on auxiliary
or out-of-band (OOB) communication, such as audio, visual,
or tactile channels, is a well-established research direction.
However, prior work shows that this approach to pairing can
be prone to human errors of different forms that may directly
or indirectly translate into man-in-the-middle attacks. To
address this problem, we propose a general direction of the
use of computer games for pairing. Since games are a popu-
lar means of entertainment, our hypothesis is that they may
serve as an incentive to users and make the pairing process
enjoyable for them, thus improving the usability, as well as
the security, of the pairing process.
We consider an emerging use case of pairing whereby two
different users are involved, each in possession of his or her
own device (e.g., Alice and Bob pairing their smartphones
for social interactions). We develop “Alice Says,” a pair-
ing game based on a popular memory game called Simon
(Says), and discuss the underlying design challenges. We
also present a preliminary evaluation of Alice Says via a
usability study and demonstrate its feasibility in terms of
usability and security. Our results indicate that overall Al-
ice Says was deemed as a fun and an enjoyable way to pair
devices, confirming our hypothesis. However, contrary to
our intuition, the relatively slower speed of Alice Says pair-
ing was found to be a cause of concern and prompts the
need for the design of faster pairing games. We put forth
several ways in which this issue can be ameliorated. In ad-
dition, we also discuss several other security problems which
are lacking optimal solutions and suggest ideas on how en-
tertainment can be used to improve the current state of the
art solutions that have been developed to address them.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management Of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection
General Terms
Design, Experimentation, Security, Human Factors
Keywords
Device Pairing, Entertainment, Games, Mobility, Security,
Ubiquitous Computing, Usability
1. INTRODUCTION
Short and medium-range wireless communication based
on technologies such as Bluetooth, WiFi, and RFID (Radio
Frequency IDentification), is becoming increasingly popular
and promises to remain so in the future. This surge in popu-
larity unfortunately brings various security risks along with
it. Wireless communication channels are easy to eavesdrop
upon and manipulate. Therefore, a fundamental security
objective is to secure such data transfer mediums. In this
paper, we use the term “pairing” to refer to the operation
of bootstrapping secure communication between two wire-
less devices in a way that is resistant to eavesdropping and
man-in-the-middle attacks. Examples of common use cases
for this operation include pairing between a headset and
phone, or between two smartphones. The initialization of
secure communication would be easy to achieve if there ex-
isted a global infrastructure enabling devices to share an on
or off-line trusted third party, certification authority, PKI
or pre-configured secrets. However, such a global infrastruc-
ture may not be possible in practice, thereby making pairing
an interesting and a challenging research problem.
A promising and well-established research direction to solv-
ing the pairing dilemma is to leverage an auxiliary channel,
also called an out-of-band (OOB) channel, which is gov-
erned by the users operating the devices to be paired. Ex-
amples of OOB channels include audio, visual, and tactile
channels. Unlike classical radio channels, OOB channels are
“human-perceptible,” i.e., the underlying transmission and
reception that drives these avenues of communication can
be perceived by one or more of human senses. Due to this
property, OOB communication naturally provides authenti-
cation and integrity, unlike radio communication. In other
words, a user can validate the intended source of an OOB
message and an adversary can not manipulate the OOB mes-
sages in transit, although he can perform a variety of other
actions, such as eavesdropping upon data sent across the
channel.
The usability of pairing based on OOB channels is clearly
very important. Since the OOB channels typically have low
bandwidth, the shorter the data that a pairing method needs
to transmit over these channels, the better the method be-
comes in terms of usability. To this end, a recent innova-
tion in pairing are the so-called Short Authenticated String
(SAS) based protocols [16, 22, 6, 8, 34] that limit the length
of data to be transmitted over OOB channels to only 15 bits
or so, while achieving a reasonable level of security. Using
these protocols, a wide-variety of pairing methods based on
visual, audio, tactile, and infrared OOB channels have been
proposed. We refer the reader to a survey and comparative
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analysis of various OOB pairing methods [11]. (We will later
summarize these in Section 2.1).
The focus of this paper is on social pairing scenarios [12],
whereby two different users (Alice and Bob) control their re-
spective devices while pairing them. Examples include pair-
ing between Alice’s and Bob’s PDAs, laptops, or cell phones
for social or professional reasons, such as sharing files and
music, exchanging digital business cards, multiplayer games,
messaging, chatting, or collaborative applications. The main
advantage of using Bluetooth or WiFi in such scenarios is
that no infrastructure is needed and thus ad hoc communi-
cation can take place without any extra cost to the users.
For this reason, social scenarios have been emerging rapidly
and are already quite popular, especially in developing coun-
tries. Secure pairing of users’ devices is a natural and recom-
mended way to prevent any eavesdropping and/or malicious
intervention during their intended communication. Further-
more, note that most scenarios necessitating OOB pairing
techniques are by definition social in nature. This is be-
cause of the fact that if a single user is the administrator of
both of the devices to be paired, he or she can simply use a
pre-shared secret on both devices to accomplish pairing in a
straightforward fashion.
1.1 Research Challenges
We remark that the problem of social pairing is simpler
than a commonplace problem of personal pairing, whereby
both devices are controlled by a single user (Alice). Ex-
amples of personal pairing include pairing between Alice’s
Bluetooth headset and her cell phone, her PDA and her
wireless printer, or her laptop and a wireless access point.
This is because, unlike personal pairing, the devices taking
part in social pairing are not usually constrained in terms
of input/output interfaces. In fact, most modern cell phone
class of devices are equipped with a wide variety of interfaces
which make establishment of OOB channels much simpler.
Unfortunately, even the seemingly simple problem of so-
cial pairing turns out to be daunting in practice and remains
unsolved despite being subject to several recent years of re-
search. Prior work on pairing raises several usability and se-
curity related concerns and fundamental research challenges.
The most prominent of these challenges are as follows:
• Most existing pairing methods are based on SAS proto-
cols that use very short strings, perhaps only 15 bits in
length. The level of security provided by these meth-
ods may therefore not be sufficient for certain appli-
cations. Increasing the length of SAS strings, on the
other hand, may lead to poor usability and security
because the process will become lengthier. Methods
that are automated (e.g., based on cameras) and can
transmit longer SAS strings, are also shown to have
undesirable usability properties [11].
• Even while using short OOB strings, several comparison-
based pairing methods (i.e., those based on compari-
son of OOB strings) do not offer the theoretical level
of security guaranteed by their underlying protocols,
as demonstrated in [11]. This is due to the potential
these protocols have for human errors. Such errors can
be of two forms: fatal and safe [33]. Fatal errors occur
when a user accepts a pairing instance, although the
OOB strings on the two devices did not match, leading
to the potential for a man-in-the-middle attack. Safe
errors, on the other hand, occur when a user rejects
a pairing instance even when the OOB strings on the
two devices match. Such errors undermine the usabil-
ity of pairing, but can also have an indirect impact on
security; a failed pairing necessitates repetition, which
may lead to user annoyance and translate into attacks
eventually.
• A more serious issue is that security of pairing often
has to rely upon the decision made by the users. As
a result, a rushing user [28]1 may simply just “accept”
the pairing, without having to correctly take part in
the decision process. Pairing methods that are based
on transfer of OOB strings (and decision made by the
devices instead) are naturally resistant to rushing user
behavior, but are still prone to safe errors [33].
The aforementioned challenges motivate the design of a
radically different approach to pairing. The central research
question can be summarized as: can we design pairing meth-
ods that can handle longer OOB strings, and are as resistant
as possible to potential safe and fatal errors, as well as to the
rushing user behavior? This question can, alternatively and
fundamentally, be framed as follows: can we design pair-
ing methods that incentivize the users, in some way, so that
they correctly take part in the pairing process, thus providing
improved security as well as user experience?
1.2 Motivation: Games for Pairing
To help answer the above question, we propose a gen-
eral direction of the application of computer games for pair-
ing of devices. The incentive that we provide to the user,
while they pair their devices, is fun and entertainment. Since
games are a popular means of entertainment, our hypothesis
is that they may improve the security as well as usability of
pairing, and help solve the challenges outline above.
We try to delve deeper as to why a game should be used
to address the problem of device pairing. If the pairing of
personal wireless devices was known to be a solved problem
with a straightforward satisfactory solution, this would not
be necessary. This is not the case, however, as discussed
in Section 1.1. Users may not be aware of or care about
the impact their actions during this process may have on
the security of their appliances. As a result of this lack
of engagement in the process of pairing, they may not do
their best to complete the pairing or may attempt to skip it
entirely, if possible.
To address this issue, we propose the reframing of the
pairing process not as a tedious procedure that puts a costly
burden on users, but rather as a game that is enjoyable
and entertaining to complete. It is our aim to transform
the operation of device pairing from one that users seek to
avoid or complete as quickly as possible into one that they
relish. As a result, users will be more attentive to the steps
they must follow while pairing and perform better at it.
Furthermore, if a game involves competitiveness between
more than one individual, this will provide another layer
of motivation to put forth their best possible performance.
Another important side effect of a game can be that, due
to its entertainment value, users will be willing to spend
1A rushing user is a user who – in a rush to connect her
devices – would skip through the pairing process, if possible
[28].
more time during the pairing process. This way potentially
longer OOB strings can be used, thus providing higher level
of security.
In essence, we are suggesting that by contextualizing a
security task as a game rather than a chore, the usability
burden of this task can be greatly reduced. We dub this
the Tom Sawyer Effect after a well known event in Mark
Twain’s literary classic, “The Adventures of Tom Sawyer”
[19]. In this novel, the boy Tom Sawyer is chastised by his
Aunt Polly by being forced to paint a fence on his day off.
Tom resents the fact that he must complete this task instead
of enjoying his free day by playing games with his friends.
To escape his plight, the clever Sawyer acts as though he
is having a good time performing his task rather than re-
senting it. Upon observing his supposed delight, his friends
insist that they be given an opportunity to paint the fence
so that they can enjoy it as well, going as far as to trade
him trinkets for the opportunity to do so. Much in the same
way that Tom convinces his friends to complete what would
otherwise be considered an uninteresting job by treating it
as a game, we seek to persuade users to be attentive during
security operations, such as device pairing, by making them
as entertaining as possible.
1.3 Contributions
We develop “Alice Says,” a pairing game based on a pop-
ular memory game called Simon (Says), and discuss design
challenges behind this construction. We also present a pre-
liminary evaluation of Alice Says via a usability study and
demonstrate its feasibility in terms of usability and security.
Our results indicate that, overall, Alice Says was deemed to
be a fun and enjoyable way to pair devices, confirming our
hypothesis. It was also found to be robust to human mis-
takes. However, contrary to our intuition, the speed of Alice
Says pairing was found to be a cause of concern and prompts
the need for the design of faster pairing games. We put forth
several ways in which this issue can be ameliorated. In ad-
dition, we also discuss several other security problems which
are lacking optimal solutions and suggest ideas on how en-
tertainment can be used to improve the current state of the
art solutions that have been developed to address them.
Outline:
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First,
in Section 2, we discuss prior device pairing methods and the
work that relates to the use of games for security applica-
tions. In Sections 3 and 4, we present the design and imple-
mentation of our pairing game Alice Says. This is followed
by Section 5 where we report our first usability evaluation of
Alice Says. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss the results and
implications of our study, the lessons learned and possible
applications of games to solve other security problems.
2. RELATEDWORK
2.1 Prior Pairing Methods
In this subsection, we discuss prior pairing methods, and,
in particular, outline whether or not they are resistant to
rushing user behavior. In doing so, we distinguish the meth-
ods into two categories (as discussed in [28]): device-controlled
(DC) and user-controlled (UC) following the terminology in-
troduced in [28]. In a DC method, device decides the out-
come of paring, whereas in a UC method, user decides the
outcome of pairing. Note that a DC method would be nat-
urally resistant to rushing user behavior, but a UC method
is not.
In their seminal work, Stajano, et al. [32] proposed es-
tablishing a shared secret between two devices using a link
created through a physical contact (such as an electric ca-
ble). This is a DC method and is resistant to rushing user.
However, in many settings, establishing such a physical con-
tact might not be possible, for example, the devices might
not have common interfaces to do so or it might be too
cumbersome to carry the cables along. Balfanz, et al. [3]
extended this approach through the use of infrared channel
– the devices exchange their public keys over the wireless
channel followed by exchanging (at least 80-bit long) hashes
of their respective public keys over infrared. This is also a
DC method. The main drawback of this method, however, is
that it is only applicable to devices equipped with infrared
transceivers. Moreover, the infra-red channel is not easily
perceptible by human users.
Another approach taken by a few research papers is to
perform the key exchange over the wireless channel and au-
thenticate it by requiring the users to manually and visually
compare the established secret on both devices. Since man-
ually comparing the established secret or its hash is cum-
bersome for the users, methods were designed to make this
visualization simpler. These include Snowflake mechanism
[9] by Levienet et al., Random Arts visual hash [23] by Perrig
et al., etc. These methods require high-resolution displays
and are thus only applicable to a limited number of devices,
such as laptops. Moreover, these are UC methods and thus
are vulnerable to a rushing user.
Based on the pairing protocol of Balfanz et al. [3], Mc-
Cune et al. proposed the“Seeing-is-Believing” (SiB) method
[20]. SiB involves establishing two unidirectional visual chan-
nels – one device encodes the data into a two-dimensional
barcode and the other device reads it using a photo camera.
SiB is a DC method. However, since the method requires
both devices to have cameras, it is only suitable for pairing
devices such as camera phones. Moreover, a recent study
[11] shows that users may not be comfortable handling cam-
eras and this method may not be very usable.
Goodrich, et al. [10], proposed “Loud-and-Clear (L&C)”,
a pairing method based on “MadLib” sentences. The main
idea of L&C is to encode the OOB data into MadLib sen-
tences and have the user compare these sentences displayed
or spoken out on two devices. Clearly, this is a UC method
and is thus vulnerable to rushing user behavior. Moreover,
the method is not applicable to pairing scenarios where one
of the devices does not have a display or a speaker.
Saxena et al. [27] proposed a pairing method based on
visual OOB channel. The method uses one of the SAS pro-
tocols [16], and is aimed at pairing two devices A and B (such
as a cell phone and an access point), only one of which (say,
B) has a relevant receiver (such as a camera). First, a uni-
directional channel is established by device A transmitting
the SAS data, e.g., by using a blinking LED and device B
receiving it using a video camera. This is followed by device
B comparing the received data with its own copy of the SAS
data and displaying the result of comparison. Finally, the
user reads the result and accordingly indicates the result to
device A. In one direction (i.e., from A to B), this is a DC
method and is thus resistant to rushing user behavior. In
the other direction, however, it is a UC method – a rushing
user can simply accept the pairing on A without looking at
the pairing outcome on B.
Uzun et al. [33] carry out a comparative usability study
of simple pairing methods. They consider pairing scenarios
where devices are capable of displaying 4-digits of SAS data.
In what they call the “Compare-and-Confirm” approach (a
UC method), the user simply reads and compares the SAS
data displayed on both devices. The “Select-and-Confirm”
approach (a DC method), on the other hand, requires the
user to select a 4-digit string (out of a number of strings) on
one device that matches with the 4-digit string on the other
device. The third approach, called “Copy-and-Confirm” (a
DC method), requires the user to read the data from one de-
vice and input it onto the other. Both Select-and-Confirm
and Copy-and-Confirm are DC methods. However, since
they are based on the protocol of [27], they offer protection
against a rushing user only in one direction. Kuo et al. [13]
defined a common baseline for hardware features and a con-
sistent, interoperable user experience across pairing of dif-
ferent devices. This work did not yield any pairing method
as such.
Some recent papers have focused upon pairing devices
which possess constrained interfaces, including access points,
headsets, which lack good quality output interfaces (e.g., a
speaker, display) and/or receivers (e.g., microphone, cam-
era). These include the BEDA method [30] which requires
the users to transfer the SAS strings from one device to
the other using “button presses”. In [24, 26], Saxena et al.
presented similar pairing methods universally applicable to
any pair of devices. The method can be based on any of
the existing SAS protocols and does not require devices to
have good transmitters or any receivers, that is, just a pair
of LEDs is sufficient. These method involves users compar-
ing very simple audiovisual patterns, such as “beeping” and
“blinking”. Most recently, the approach of [24] was extended
by making use of an auxiliary device, such as a smartphone
[29]. Both these methods, however, are UC methods and
thus offer no protection against a rushing user.
In [31], Soriente et al. consider the problem of pairing two
devices which might not share any common wireless commu-
nication channel at the time of pairing, but do share only a
common audio channel. This is a DC method, however, it is
only limited to devices which possess a speaker at the trans-
mitting end and a microphone at the receiving end. More-
over, this method still requires the user to perform manual
comparison of SAS data (e.g., using the L&C method [10])
and is thus not resistant to rushing user behavior.
2.2 Games and Security
Our work was in a way inspired by the work of Halprin
and Naor [25]. These researchers recently proposed the use
of games to address the problem of computer random num-
ber generation. Computers often use inputs from users as
an entropy source. Unfortunately, when asked to cooperate
in this endeavor, human users tend to perform poorly by
interacting with the machine in a predictable fashion.
More critically, human beings are notoriously bad at be-
having randomly or recognizing randomness in a natural set-
ting. When asked to construct random sequences, people’s
output are riddled with numerous biases. There remains
some hope for human entropy generation, however. Inter-
estingly, when placed in competitive situations [25], such as
zero sum games or any other situation where individuals
are asked to attempt to outperform one another, humans
demonstrate a heightened aptitude for behaving randomly.
Therefore, security gains are noted over traditional entropy
generation requests when users are asked to participate in
a game that forces them to behave randomly and then har-
vests entropy from their actions.
The pairing mechanism that we present in this work is an
example of a “Game with a Purpose” as conceptualized by
von Ahn [14]. This is because it is not simply a game for its
own sake, but rather a form of entertainment that simulta-
neously achieves a computational result without the explicit
awareness of its users. The reCAPTCHA [15] project of von
Ahn et al. is also tangentially related to this line of research.
While it does not involve any games or entertainment, this
program also“fools”users into doing work beyond what they
may realize. A CAPTCHA is a tool that attempts to distin-
guish between a human user and a computerized entity by
presenting requesters with a task that is relatively easy for
a human to accomplish but more difficult for a computer to
achieve. This most often takes the form of presenting users
with a word or phrase that has been obscured, distorted, or
is otherwise difficult to read. reCAPTCHA not only serves
this adjudicative purpose, but also utilizes the responses it
receives to aid in the digitization of words in print media.
3. DESIGN OF A PAIRING GAME
3.1 Threat Model
Before discussing the design of our secure device pairing
game, Alice Says, it is first necessary to establish the ad-
versarial model for the scenario it is intended to operate in.
(This is the same model followed by various pairing meth-
ods based on the SAS protocols [34].) The two wireless
devices to be paired may establish two types of communica-
tion channels between each other. The first is a traditional
wireless connection. This type of channel is characterized by
a large bandwidth capacity and bidirectionality, but is short
range in nature. The second variety compromise the set of
OOB channels, which feature relatively modest bandwidths
but are physically authenticatable. That is, OOB channels
are crafted from forms of output which can be perceived by
unassisted humans, providing users with the power to verify
the transmission source themselves. This implies that any
malicious entity who wishes to manipulate data in transit
over an OOB channel would not be capable of modifying
any messages. OOB channels are not generally secret, how-
ever. This means that besides the modification restriction,
adversaries can observe the OOB transmission in any other
way they see fit. In contrast, opponents have unfettered con-
trol of the conventional wireless channel, and can operate on
messages sent across it as they see fit.
3.2 Choice of the Game
In order to leverage the Tom Sawyer effect to improve
the device pairing experience (as discussed in Section 1.2),
a suitable game had to be designed. We took our inspira-
tion from an existing game, Hasbro’s Simon [1]. While this
game was originally a freestanding electronic device, many
derivatives have been created that can be played on mobile
devices or through a web browser on a traditional computer,
such as the one found here [2].
This game was selected as a basis for our pairing game
for several reasons. First and foremost, Simon is a well es-
tablished game, having been created over three decades ago,
with a loyal following. Rather than creating a new game
from scratch, which users may or may not find enjoyable, we
hoped to leverage the known popularity of Simon. Further-
more, this game is relatively uncomplicated when compared
with the contemporary generation of computer games. This
was desirable both due to its ease of implementation, which
did not require a large team of programmers well versed in
graphical and game programming, as well as its suitability
for players of all ages and levels of experience. That is, Si-
mon was selected to appeal to as broad a swath of users
as possible rather than a niche group of die hard computer
“gamers.” Finally, an important factor in the selection of
this game is its close relation to existing device pairing solu-
tions. Previous work has established the use of patterns of
synchronized audio and visual output [24, 26, 30] as a viable
method of securely associating devices. At its core, playing
Simon involves nothing more than the short term memoriza-
tion of audiovisual patterns and thus minimal changes were
required to adapt it for use in pairing.
3.3 Alice Says Game Design
In order to answer the questions put forth in Section 1,
specifically, the effect of entertainment on the device pairing
process, we developed a pairing game dubbed Alice Says
based on the classic electronic memory game, Simon (Says).
Upon initially starting the game, users are provided a screen
showing the name of the game with two menu choices: a
single player training mode and a two player pairing mode.
Optionally, an all-time high score can also be displayed.
3.3.1 Single Player Mode
In accordance with the Tom Sawyer effect we crafted Al-
ice Says to promote, a single player mode is provided to
allow users an opportunity to unwittingly train themselves
to improve their device pairing performance. This opera-
tional mode is essentially identical to the classic version of
Simon, only adapted to the context of a mobile device. The
user is shown a screen with four adjacent squares which fully
occupy the screen, dividing it into quadrants. Each of these
squares is a unique and distinctive color. Clockwise starting
in the upper left, the colors are green, red, blue, and finally
yellow. Besides these color coded screen segments, the only
other item visible to the user while the game is underway
is a counter which tracks the length of the pattern that a
user has matched thus far. This increments with each new
button press that is added to the pattern list.
One of these four quadrant buttons is randomly selected
by the device during each round. The selection is indicated
to the user in two complimentary ways. First, the screen
section is lit by increasing its luminance. Secondly, a tone
corresponding to that quadrant is played. In order to max-
imize the enjoyment of the game by users, the notes as-
sociated with the four portions of the screen are carefully
selected to be harmonically compatible with each other irre-
spective of the order in which they are played. Indeed, this
was a critical component behind the game’s widespread pop-
ularity. Since the Simon user interface consists of four color
quadrants, each step of the pattern can be used to encode
two OOB bits in the following straightforward manner: “00”
corresponds to green, “01” is indicative of red, “10” means
blue, and “11” is aligned with yellow.
If a user presses the screen quadrant that correctly corre-
sponds to the one that had just been selected by the device,
it then constructs a pattern of colors and sounds by display-
ing the first screen segment followed by a new, randomly
chosen one, again conveyed to the user by brightening the
relevant portion of the screen and playing a corresponding
melodic tone. This process continues until the user makes
an error in the pattern or a certain predetermined pattern
length threshold value is reached. At this point a “Game
Over” message is provided to the user, informing him or her
of what the correct move should have been as well as the
length of the pattern they were successfully able to match.
If a high score is maintained and was surpassed, this is up-
dated at this point as well.
3.3.2 Two Player Mode
The two player mode is what actually accomplishes device
pairing. It differs from the single player, traditional Simon
approach in two main ways. First, the game does not con-
clude when a mistake is made. It continues until a sufficient
number of OOB bits have been relayed between the two de-
vices. Secondly, the game is split across two devices. One
device displays the pattern to the user, but does not handle
input. The other does not display the pattern, but instead
only accepts user input. A two player pairing game was se-
lected in lieu of a single player game because the need to
pair two wireless devices implies that there will always be
two parties present to participate in the pairing. Less intu-
itively, a two player game will also reap the security benefits
of fostering competition between its players, hopefully re-
sulting in an amplification of the Tom Sawyer effect.
As a result of the second difference, a mechanism is re-
quired to keep the two devices in sync during the pairing
procedure. This is because the device accepting input must
be aware of what portion of the pattern has been displayed
to the user to be able to conclude whether or not he or she
has committed a mistake. A naive way to handle this would
be to simply transmit the current index into the binary OOB
string over the wireless channel. This would ruin the security
of the system, however, as the wireless channel is assumed to
be totally insecure as per the security assumptions detailed
in Section 3.1. Thus, an adversary could simply transmit an
arbitrary index over the string, bypassing as much of it as
he or she desired. Instead, we addressed the synchronization
issue by integrating “previous” and “next” buttons into the
displaying phone’s interface.
Upon a successful match, the player in control of the dis-
play phone presses next to advance the state of the game
and display the next, slightly longer pattern. If an error is
made while inputting the pattern, on the other hand, this
user can indicate that this is the case to the displaying de-
vice by pressing the previous button. In this event, a new
pattern is crafting starting with the last bit of the pattern
which was matched unsuccessfully. This is done because, as
an invariant, the devices know that the users have already
successfully transferred all OOB bits up until this point.
After a mistake is made, the input device will check its run-
ning tally of how many bits have been successfully matched
compared to how many bits of the OOB string need to be
transferred.If more bits need to be compared, the game con-
tinues. If mutual authentication is desired, the roles of the
phones can be swapped following a successful game in a sin-
gle direction. After this, the game play would proceed in
precisely the same way with the roles of the two phones,
and two users, reversed.
3.3.3 Example Usage Scenario
The following is an example of an anticipated game play
pattern. Assume a legitimate pairing session in which a user
is consistently able to follow a pattern of length 5. There
are 30 bits in the OOB string that need to be compared.
The user will first be provided with a pattern of length one,
then the pattern will be extended to length two, and so on.
On the sixth round, the user will make a mistake. Having
successfully exchanged the first 10 bits of the key hash, the
game will then begin a new pattern starting with the 11th
and 12th bits of the OOB string. Upon making another
mistake at length 6, the game will begin with a new pat-
tern starting with the 21st and 22nd key OOB bits. After
successfully completing the next session of 5 bits, all 30 bits
will have been conveyed, concluding the game.
3.4 Security Guarantees
One important, and subtly tricky, aspect to this design
is how to handle attacked sessions. If a session has been
attacked or an error has occurred, the OOB strings calcu-
lated on the two devices will be different. Thus, even if a
user “correctly” matches the displayed pattern, Alice Says
will still register an error. This will either occur as the first
bit of a pattern or a sub-sequential bit of the pattern. If
the attack occurs as a sub-sequential bit, the bits prior to
the error will be registered as a match for that session and
the pattern will begin anew with the attacked bit, making it
the first bit of the next pattern. Thus, one way or another,
the attacked bit will end up as the first bit of a pattern,
and users will be unable to proceed by identifying the single
color pattern that has been displayed to them.
Thus, users will need to be provided with a mechanism
for restarting the pairing session from scratch. To achieve
this, after a certain threshold of single color pattern mis-
matches have occurred (e.g., 2), a message along the lines
of “It seems that something has gone wrong. Would you
like to restart the session? [Y/N]” will be displayed. At this
point, users can scrap the entire session and start over with a
new, hopefully unattacked and error free, session. Note that
single color pattern mismatches should be very unlikely in
unattacked sessions, as most users are anticipated to be able
to handle matching at least one color. Thus, the only way
for a critical error to occur in this system is for users to in-
correctly match a single color. There is only a 1 in 4 chance
of this occurring, even if the user is not paying any attention
whatsoever and just guessing at the pattern, yielding a high
level of practical security. Note that while it is theoretically
possible for a player to complete pairing with Alice Says by
making random color quadrant choices, this would take pro-
hibitively long to achieve, and it is therefore not plausible
for such an attack to succeed.
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF ALICE SAYS
We set out to develop Alice Says, our game that would
preserve the popular aspects of the classic electronic Simon
while updating it to a two player mobile device setting. Its
user interface is dominated by four large color buttons as
was the case with its ancestor. Also intended to mimic the
original was the association of a unique tone with each of
these keys. A critical aspect of the original game’s appeal
was the fact that these sounds were designed to harmonic
irrespective of the order in which they were played, which is
important as the game play involves striking the inputs in
a random order. Thus we tried to stay true to the original
game’s sounds by assigning an A note to the first input, an
A note one octave higher to the second, a D note that is a
perfect fourth above the initial A note to the third button,
and finally a G note that was a perfect fourth higher than
the D to the last key.
4.1 Java Micro Edition
We utilized two Nokia model N97 mobile phones to realize
our Alice Says prototype. These devices support the Java
Platform, Micro Edition (J2ME) environment, which we de-
signed our code to operate in. Since the primary objective
of our device pairing prototype was to test its usability, we
focused largely on crafting a user interface that was as in-
tuitive and user friendly as possible. Thus, one of the most
essential design decisions that needed to be made was which
J2ME API to build our game upon. Initially we used the
Lightweight User Interface Toolkit to this end, as it provided
the most streamlined interface available. Unfortunately, the
use of this API proved to be problematic. While the N97
model phones met the toolkit’s requirements, this particular
phone model’s Java Virtual Machine implementation caused
some of its components to crash at run time. This was dis-
cernable due to the fact that while library executed properly
while being emulated but did not operate properly on the
devices themselves.
As an alternative, we instead utilized the lower level APIs
provided by the Nokia N97 SDK. The majority of the graph-
ics used in Alice Says were drawn using the Graphics class
of Java Specification Request (JSR) 118 in the 2.0 revision
of the Mobile Information Device Profile. This low level
graphics object provided built in function calls that allowed
us full control over painting the screen as well as handling
user inputs through the N97’s touch screens. Menu options
were handled using JSR 118’s CommandListener class. To
further enhance our design, the device accepting user in-
put had no commands available to go back or forward in
the Alice Says pattern. Instead, it kept track of whether or
not an error occurred and automatically adjusted the pat-
tern length in accordance with user errors. On the other
hand, the device displaying the pattern accepted no input
to prevent the possibility of a user disrupting the pattern by
mistake.
4.2 Device Setup
The Nokia N97 smartphones provided numerous interfaces
that were well suited for exploring the usability of device
pairing. For example, they featured a resistive touch screen
which allowed users to interact directly with what is shown
on its display. This imbued the game with a more realistic
user experience. Also enhancing the usability of the game
was the stereo speakers featured on the N97s, which are ca-
pable of outputting high quality sound even at lower volume
settings. This allowed us to keep the game’s melodic tones
as close to those used in the original Simon game as possi-
ble. A picture of Alice Says set-up from our implementation
is shown in Figure 1 and a clearer image of the game’s core
user interface, taken from an emulator, is displayed in Figure
2.
5. USABILITY EXPERIMENTATION
Figure 1: Alice Says Game Set-up
Figure 2: Close Up Image of the Alice Says User
Interface
A user study was conducted in order to assess the viability
of game-based pairing in general and Alice Says in partic-
ular. These experiments were intended to achieve several
goals. Primarily, their focus was on gaining an understand-
ing of the usability of this pairing process. These tests were
intended to determine if the new game software could be
used by real users to consistently and reliably pair devices.
In other words, we desired to discover whether users felt
that playing a game while pairing was useful or not. In
addition, a secondary test objective was to collect feedback
from users regarding Alice Says. A final aim was to ascertain
the efficiency of Alice Says by measuring its overall practical
execution time.
5.1 Experimental Framework
In order to evaluate Alice Says, an environment was es-
tablished where users were able to get hands on experience
with our prototype of the game. Review 4 for full details on
the implementation of this new pairing system. Our inten-
tion was to create a testing framework that mirrored a real
world usage scenario as closely as possible while remaining
uncomplicated. An example of this is the omission of an
in-band wireless link between the two mobile devices. Since
this process does not have a noticeable impact on the usabil-
ity of the pairing game, it was safely left out in favor of OOB
strings created using a pseudorandom pattern generated on
a desktop machine using the Mersenne Twister [18] imple-
mentation included in the random module of the Python
programming language’s standard library. The strings uti-
lized in these test cases were pseudorandomly generated,
but fixed from subject to subject to prevent some volun-
teers from receiving strings that were easier to identify than
others. These strings were presented to the test subjects in
a random order. This was done to minimize the effects of
learning and fatigue on the test results. In other words, we
wanted to prevent users from anticipating future test cases
based on previous ones or losing motivation to pay proper
attention during the pairing procedure.
An automated feedback interface was used on a desktop
computer to facilitate this usability analysis. This was used
to present post-condition questionnaires to users following
their completion of the study proper. In addition to the
SUS scale, the exact phrasing of the post-condition survey
questions that were presented to volunteers were as follows:
1. The method was enjoyable.
2. The method took a long time.
3. I would like to pair with another user’s devices by mak-
ing use of this method.
4. The sound effects used in this method were pleasant
to listen to.
Beyond this, logging was performed on the mobile devices
themselves in order to capture both the timing of the events
comprising the pairing procedure as well as any user mis-
takes that were made along the way.
5.2 Participant Information
20 test subjects were invited to participate in this usabil-
ity survey. Participants were gathered from students, pro-
fessors, and staff members studying and working in labs at
our institution. Word of the study was spread using flyers,
emails, and in-person sign ups during the weeks prior to its
occurrence. To encourage participation in our study, movie
theater gift certificates were offered to testers upon the com-
pletion of their involvement in the study. The post-condition
survey questions themselves are provided in Section 5.1.
Demographic information about these testers was collected
as a component of the pre-conditioning phase of the exper-
iment. Our subjects had varying ages, but were predomi-
nately young as would be expected from a pool containing
university students. Half were between 18 and 24, while 30%
had ages of 25 to 29. There were several older individuals
counted in our survey as well, however. 5% of our sample
population, or one user, was older than 29 but younger than
35. An additional user, comprising another 5% of our user
group, was between 35 and 39 years of age. Finally, 10%
of our sample was made up of people whose age exceeded
40. A majority, 65%, of subjects were male although many
females were also represented, comprising 35% of the total.
Another area in which sampling college students had an ef-
fect was on the level of education our testers had obtained.
One tester (5%) did not possess a college degree, 65% had
obtained their bachelor’s, 25% had obtained their master’s
degree, and one user (5%) had completed his or her doctor-
ate.
Beyond demographics, the post-conditional survey pre-
sented users with queries intended to measure their level of
expertise with device pairing and video games. 70% of par-
ticipants had paired a wireless device before. This was not
somewhat surprising result considering the ubiquitous na-
ture of wireless devices and the need to pair them. This can
perhaps be attributed to a misunderstanding of what con-
stitutes device pairing, as it could be anticipated that most
participants had utilized a wireless connection on their lap-
top or paired a wireless remote control with a television or
gaming appliance. Remarkably, every participant responded
that they played video games. This figure demonstrates the
widespread popularity of computer games and bodes well for
their acceptance by users as a means of facilitating secure
usage habitats.
5.3 Experimental Design
In this section, the design choices necessary to recreate the
results of this study are explored. To initiate the experiment,
the test administrator first selected Alice Says, represented
by a Alice icon, from the mobile device’s application list.
The single player version of Alice Says was then initiated by
selecting the “1 Player” option from the application’s menu.
Users were then presented with the mobile device to provide
them with an opportunity to acclimate themselves with the
user interface and overall gameplay of Alice Says. Once they
felt that they had gained enough experience, users halted the
single player game section by selecting a back button from
the game menu.
Next, the formal testing procedure was started by select-
ing complimentary game modes on each of the two devices.
This was done via a text field that numerically specified one
for the output device and two for the input device. Match-
ing test cases were specified on the two devices in an identi-
cal manner. Once the options were put into place, the two
player pairing mode was initiated by selecting a “2 Player”
choice from the menu on the mobile device. This brought
the primary Alice Says interface, consisting of four colored
quadrants and a central pattern score counter, up on their
devices. As a final step to initiate testing, the “Start” menu
option was pressed on each device.
For the first two test cases performed with each subject,
the participant handled the input device while the test ad-
ministrator took care of the output duties. Thus, to start
the game and whenever the volunteer successfully matched a
pattern, the administrator selected the “Next” option on the
Alice Says menu. In the event that the participant commit-
ted a mistake and did not successfully match the provided
pattern, the test conductor pressed a “previous” button to
signal to the device that it should create a new pattern start-
ing with the last bit of the incorrectly matched pattern.
Meanwhile, the tester’s job was to observe the audiovisual
pattern displayed on the output device and input it on their
mobile appliance. Two test cases were performed in this
configuration to ensure that owe provided our subjects with
system experience that was generalizable and not specific to
any individual test case. Following this, a third and final
test case was performed with the role of the administrator
and subject reversed by switching the mode options on the
two mobile phones. This was done to give users hands on
experience with both sides of the two player game; this is im-
portant because in a real life scenario this will often be done
to achieve mutual authentication as discussed in Section 3.
After the conclusion of the central portion of the experi-
ment, subjects were presented with a web form containing
a set of post-conditioning queries. Beyond the demographic
and background information listed in Section 5.2, this ques-
tionnaire consisted of fifteen five point Likert items which
were selected to gauge how volunteers felt about Alice Says.
The precise questions posed are provided in Section 5.1. The
first ten of these questions were provided to evaluate this
technique using the System Usability Scale (SUS) [4], mod-
ified slightly to refer to Alice Says as a method rather than
a system.
5.4 Experimental Results
The observed results of the usability study are presented
in this part of the paper. Each test subject performed two
input sessions and one output session for a total of three test
cases per user and 60 test cases overall. The average time
that users took to pair using Alice says was 173.267 sec-
onds with a standard deviation of 28.638 seconds. In terms
of reliability, an average of 1.517 mistakes were made while
performing the pairing process (i.e., an average of 1.517 mis-
takes per pairing session). Note that these are all partial
errors as pairing still completed successfully following their
occurrence for all test cases. Some user errors were caused
by an inability to recall the displayed pattern, while oth-
ers were caused by users accidentally pressing the incorrect
color button, though it is difficult to separate these two oc-
currences in practice.
5.4.1 User Feedback
Figure 3: Average Responses to Post-Conditional
Questionnaire
Figure 3 provides the responses users gave on the post-
condition survey. Users awarded Alice Says with an average
SUS score of 70.5 and a standard deviation of 12.860. In
response to whether or not Alice Says was enjoyable, users
provided an average response of 3.85. When asked if this
pairing process took a long time, users responded with a 3.1.
However, they also suggested that they would like to utilize
Alice Says by providing the highest average score observed,
3.88, to question thirteen. Users tended to agree that the
sounds used in the game were pleasant, providing a 3.55
average response to this query. Finally, on the last question
of whether Alice Says was considered to be secure, users
again replied positively with a 3.65.
Some users also responded to our open-ended question
about Alice Says. They positively indicated that the par-
ing method is “pretty good”, “a fun way to pair”, “a very
cute game”, and “a nice game” and that “they had a lot
of fun”. However, some of them complained that method
is “too long”. Some suggested, as an improvement, to make
the game “less time consuming and user-friendly”, use better
menu options than “next and previous”, make use of “better
touchscreen”, and have the game “count with me while I am
picking the colors”.
5.5 Interpretation of Results
This section outlines the implications of our test results.
5.5.1 Efficiency
The efficiency of Alice Says is clearly its least desirable
characteristic. It took slightly under three minutes to com-
plete on average, when alternative pairing approaches may
take approximately twenty to thirty seconds (see [11], e.g.)
for a similar level of security (i.e., corresponding to 30 bits).
While this extended execution time would be problematic
for pairing approaches that burden users with tedious and
repetitive tasks, this time frame is less problematic for a
game based pairing method. In a way, if a user is having
a good time while executing the pairing process, he or she
may wish to extend the technique’s execution time rather
than reduce it. However, contrary to our intuition, users
did indicate the game to be a bit lengthy. This is one of
the most important lessons learned from this study. In our
future work, we will experimentally determine the timing
threshold that average users deem appropriate for a pairing
game and modify our game design to adhere to this thresh-
old (our current Alice Says prototype was not optimized in
terms of timing).
5.5.2 Reliability
On the other hand, the reliability of Alice Says is one
of its strengths. While users committed, on an average,
around one and half errors per session, the pairing game
was designed to be resilient in the face of such mistakes, and
as a result pairing concluded successfully in each and every
attempt we performed. We believe that as users become
more or more familiar with this approach (and even with
the single player mode of the game), these errors will further
be reduced. This, in turn, would also reduce the overall
execution timing of the game, thus improving usability.
5.5.3 User Feedback
Considering that the industry average for SUS scores for
computer systems are somewhere between 60 and 70 [17],
our overall SUS score for Alice Says can be termed quite
positive. Looking at the questionnaire as a whole, test sub-
jects generally agreed with the positive statements regarding
Alice Says. A majority of users concurred that the method
was enjoyable, and seemed secure. Furthermore, they also
replied that they would like to make use of it. Unfortu-
nately, as discussed above, users also agreed with the one
negative statement that was put forth. This was in relation
to the timing of the technique, which was already known
to be longer than users are accustomed to. This aspect of
the feedback prompts the need for further work on designing
games that are reasonably fast for the pairing process.
The raw feedback provided by the users that they found
the pairing process to be entertaining was heartening and is
promising towards the adoption of Alice Says in practice.
5.6 Ecological Validity
This section documents the ways in which this study con-
formed and deviated from the real life situation it was in-
tended to capture. The largest difference between this study
and an actual setting is the absence of a wireless link be-
tween the two phones being paired. This may have had
an impact on efficiency because the latency this connection
would introduce was not taken into account in our study,
but this step takes negligible time to execute compared to
the other steps involved in Alice Says. Beyond this, the only
other ecological concerns associated with this experiment are
those encountered by all usability studies in general. For ex-
ample, by performing the tests in a lab rather than in their
own home, test subjects may have performed with a height-
ened awareness of their actions. Testers may have altered
their responses to survey questions due to a desire to please
the investigators, though this effect was guarded against by
providing subjects with privacy while answering as well as
by anonymizing the results. Finally, providing motivation
for the test helped users have a better understanding of how
their actions related to real life scenario, but also may have
had a conditional effect. A pre-condition questionnaire was
not provided in order to minimize this impact, however.
6. DISCUSSION
6.1 Lessons Learned and Improvements
The most important lesson learned via the usability study
of Alice Says is the importance of efficiency (speed) in the
domain of device pairing. Prior to conducting the usability
experiments outlined in this paper, it was clear to us that
the execution time of our game prototype compared unfavor-
ably to existing solutions. We thought that due to the fact
that users were enjoying themselves while performing the
process, the slowness of the process would not cause a prob-
lem but rather help the users relish the game. This was also
reflected from the game-based solution for random number
generation by Halprin and Naor [25], which did not suffer
from any negative usability effects despite taking far longer
to complete (approximately 2 minutes to generate a 128-bit
random number [25]) than traditional user input based tech-
niques. Unfortunately, and surprisingly, this turned out not
to be the case for the scenario of pairing. In this setting, it
appears that users place a high priority on speed.
Therefore, our results prompt the need for designing pair-
ing games that also aim at minimizing the execution time.
To this end, one immediate task would be to optimize Alice
Says prototype in terms of speed. This can be done, e.g., by
determining an optimal duration for which individual colors
are flashed (currently this duration was set to be 300 ms
which we thought was quite convenient). Broadly speaking,
future design of fast pairing games presents a research chal-
lenge, however. This is because most existing games are not
designed to be completed in a matter of seconds, but rather
take minutes or hours to complete, as players wish to prolong
the process to continue enjoying the experience. However,
there has been a movement towards very brief games played
in rapid succession, known as microgames, in the video game
community that may be adaptable as a solution. Nintendo’s
WarioWare series is a prime example of this [21].
Other possible improvements to Alice Says include adding
another counter somewhere on the user interface that“counts
with”the user as they are inputting the color pattern. Though
this would be a stark deviation from the design of the origi-
nal game, it was a feature suggested by one of the test sub-
jects as something that would have a positive impact on the
game’s usability. Another improvement suggested by users
would be use devices with more responsive touch screens.
Several complaints were made about how the touch screen
on the Nokia N97s had a negative impact of the usability of
the game as a whole. Perhaps a device with a more modern
capacitance based touch interface would not suffer from this
drawback.
The efficiency problem would become even worse in cases
where mutual authentication is required; close to 6 minutes
of pairing time would be needed if our current Alice Says
prototype is used. This may not be acceptable in practice.
The game playing part can be omitted in one of the direc-
tions by having the user transfer the result of pairing from
one device to the other (as suggested in [27]). However, this
would make the pairing process vulnerable to safe and fatal
errors as well as prone to rushing user behavior, similar to
several other existing approaches (e.g., [33]). We note that
Alice Says can be effectively used to address this particular
problem. For instance, the transmission of OOB string from
device A to B could take place via traditional means (such
as using numeric representations), which will be much faster,
but the result “bit” can be transmitted via a game similar
to Alice Says by hiding the result bit within a short random
string. This would address both the problem of users being
unmotivated and erratic while selecting the correct option
on device A, as well as that of the potential slowness of the
pairing process.
6.2 Other Security Applications
As future work, we intend to explore how the Tom Sawyer
effect can be applied to various security issues to enhance us-
ability. As discussed in Section 2.2, Halprin and Naor [25]
have already applied this principle to the dilemma of ran-
dom number generation to great effect. Another area where
it may be fruitful to apply this concept is that of authenti-
cation in a variety of settings. One possibility is to improve
the usability of current mobile phone password managers
(such as KeePassMobile [5]). Such phone managers suffer
from poor usability in that the user is required to manually
transfer a (potentially long and random) password displayed
on the screen of the phone over to the authentication ter-
minal. To address this drawback, games similar to that of
Alice Says can be adopted.
Another application is authentication to a remote server,
basically as a replacement for a CAPTCHA mechanism. In
order to prove to remote servers that a human user is re-
ally behind a given request, users will be challenged to play
a game that is relatively easy for humans to complete but
difficult for computers. Finally, games may be designed to
supplement the security and privacy of“something you have”
authentication techniques by having users play a short move-
ment game in order to unlock their access tokens, such as
RFID tags. This idea is similar in spirit to the recently
proposed Secret Handshakes scheme [7], but it is aimed at
providing an enhanced level of usability.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we considered the problem of designing pair-
ing methods that incentivize users, in some way, so that they
put forth more effect and correctly take part in the pairing
process, thus providing improved security as well as enhanc-
ing the overall user experience. We dubbed this the Tom
Sawyer Effect. To this end, we proposed a general direction
of the application of computer games to solving tricky issues
in usable security. The incentive that we provide to the users
while they pair their devices is fun and entertainment. Since
games are a popular means of entertainment, our hypothesis
was that they may improve the security as well as usability
of pairing and help solve the challenges outlined above.
We developed “Alice Says,” a pairing game based on a
popular memory game called Simon (Says), and discussed
the underlying design challenges. We also presented a pre-
liminary evaluation of Alice Says via a usability study and
demonstrated its feasibility in terms of usability and secu-
rity. Our results indicate that overall Alice Says was deemed
a fun and an enjoyable way to pair devices, confirming our
hypothesis. It was also found to be robust to human mis-
takes. However, contrary to our intuition, the relatively
slower speed of Alice Says pairing was found to be a cause
of concern, which prompts the need for the design of faster
pairing games. We discussed some variations and possible
improvements to our current Alice Says prototype, and more
broadly, also outlined some of the other interesting applica-
tions of games to address lingering security problems.
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